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THE NINTH CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS HOLDS THAT THE WARSAW CONVENTION
DOES NOT APPLY TO AN ENTITY ACTING AS AN
AGENT TO MORE THAN ONE PRINCIPAL:
DAZO V. GLOBE AIRPORT SECURITY SERVICES
CHRISTA BROWN*
( OURTS HAVE consistently and almost uniformly applied
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relat-
ing to International Transportation by Air' to an airline's
agents2 and employees.' In considering whether to continue
the consistency of other courts, the Ninth Circuit of the United
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law; B.S.E.E., 2001, Rice University. The author would like to thank Christopher
Ashworth, attorney for the Plaintiff, and Jill Backer, legal assistant for the
Plaintiff's attorney, for their help in providing the briefs submitted to the courts.
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
2 A principal may be liable for the tortious conduct of an agent even if the
principal does not authorize the conduct of the agent or personally violate the
duty to the third party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 216 (1958).
3 See e.g., Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying the War-
saw Convention to employees of airlines and protecting the employees by the
Convention's liability limitations); Kabbani v. Int'l Total Servs., 805 F. Supp.
1033, 1034 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that the liability limitations of the Convention
applied when the security services took charge of an international passenger's
carry-on bag at the airport); Croucher v. Worldwide Flight Servs., 111 F. Supp. 2d
501, 505-06 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that the Warsaw Convention applied to a
cleaning service because the services were in furtherance of the contract of car-
riage); In re Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 776 F. Supp. 710,
711-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that non-employee agents are protected by the
liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention); Baker v. Landsell Protective
Agency, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 165, 170-71 (D.C.N.Y. 1984) (concluding that the War-
saw Convention limits the liability of a security company that had an agreement
with a carrier to perform a baggage security check, which fell within the scope of
the Convention). But see Pierre v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486, 489
(D.C.N.J. 1957) (holding that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to agents or
servants of carriers).
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States Court of Appeals ultimately declines4 to apply these prin-
ciples in the recent case of Dazo v. Globe Airport Security Services.5
Applying the Warsaw Convention to an airline's agents was a
question of first impression in the Ninth Circuit.6 By not apply-
ing the persuasive precedent of several jurisdictions, the court
incorrectly concluded that the Warsaw Convention did not ap-
ply to an agent of an airline. The majority's reason not to apply
the Warsaw Convention is based on a misapplication of the
breadth of the Convention and a misunderstanding of agency
law.
Ester Dazo entered Terminal C of the San Jose International
Airport on May 12, 1999 to board an 11:50 a.m. flight on Trans
World Airlines, Inc. ("TWA") to Toronto, connecting in St.
Louis.7 Globe Airport Security Services ("Globe") operated the
security checkpoint at Terminal C on behalf of three air carri-
ers: America West Airlines, Inc., TWA, and Continental Airlines
("the three airlines"). 8 Globe examined the people using metal
detectors and screened their possessions using x-ray machines. '
Both ticketed passengers and the general public were allowed to
enter the secured area, which contained the embarkation gates
and retail stores.")
Dazo placed her carry-on bag onto a conveyor belt that led to
an x-ray machine; she then passed through the metal detector."
An unknown person or persons took her carry-on bag after it
passed through the x-ray machine and traveled an additional
ten to fifteen feet. 1 2 According to Dazo, the bag contained jew-
elry with a wholesale value of approximately $100,000 in the
Philippines and worth even more in the United States. 13
4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially decided this case on May 16,
2001, and applied the Warsaw Convention to cover the agents of airlines. Dazo v.
Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 268 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2001). The circuit judges
granted a petition to rehear the case after the initial decision. Upon rehearing,
the panel decided to withdraw the opinion reported at 268 F.3d 671 and substi-
tuted another order in its place. Dazo v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 295 F.3d 934,
936 (9th Cir. 2002) (replacing the first decision by the Ninth Circuit panel).
5 Dazo, 295 F.3d at 939.
6 Dazo, 268 F.3d at 675.
7 Dazo, 295 F.3d at 936.
8 Id. at 936-37.
9 Id. at 936.
10 Id. at 937. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the general public
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Dazo filed a complaint against Globe and the three airlines in
the Northern District of California; she asserted claims of negli-
gence and breach of the implied contract of bailment, and
sought punitive damages for willful misconduct." The district
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that
the Warsaw Convention preempted her claims because the theft
occurred while Dazo was "in the course of embarking." 5 Addi-
tionally, Dazo's allegations of willful misconduct were insuffi-
cient to escape the Convention's limitation on liability.' 6 The
district court granted Dazo leave to file an amended complaint
to conform to the ruling; however, Dazo did not wish to file an
amended complaint.' 7
Dazo then filed a timely appeal to the Ninth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals. 8 When the panel of the Ninth
Circuit first heard the appeal, they affirmed the district court's
holding that extended the Warsaw Convention and limited
Globe's liability to Dazo."9 Dazo filed a petition for a panel re-
hearing, and the panel granted the petition. ° Upon rehearing,
the panel withdrew the previous opinion, reversed the district
court's holding, and remanded the case for further
proceedings.1
In the Ninth Circuit's second opinion, Judge Tashima wrote
the majority opinion, focusing most of the analysis on the appli-
cation of the Warsaw Convention to determine the extent of
Globe's possible liability.22 The court answered the following
questions to determine whether the Convention applied to
Globe: (1) was the flight an international transportation of pas-
sengers and cargo; (2) were the services provided by Globe "in
furtherance of the contract of carriage of an international
flight;" and (3) was Globe a "carrier" within the meaning of the
Warsaw Convention, acting as an agent of the three air carri-
ers. 23 In addressing the first and second questions, the majority






19 Dazo, 268 F.3d at 677; see supra note 4.
20 Dazo, 295 F.3d at 936.
21 Id. at 941.
22 Id. at 937-40.
23 Id. at 938-39.
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vices that Globe rendered to the airlines' passengers.24 The
court focused on agency principles and Globe's service to the
three airlines to determine if Globe may be afforded "carrier"
status under the Convention.2 5 Addressing the willful miscon-
duct issue, the majority agreed with the district court that Dazo
did not provide sufficient evidence to establish willful miscon-
duct; therefore, the opinion did not provide a detailed analysis
of the second issue."6
According to the court, the Warsaw Convention did not apply
to this set of facts, and the court remanded the case for further
proceedings to determine whether Globe is liable for negli-
gence or breach of the implied contract of bailment. 27 Globe
and the three airlines argued that Dazo was a "passenger" under
the Convention because she possessed a "contract of carriage"
for "international transportation. '2 The appellate court did not
focus the discussion on this argument, but readily found that
Dazo's flight was "international transportation" and did not ana-
lyze Dazo's status as a passenger.2 ' Globe and the three airlines
also argued that the bag disappeared while it was in the exclu-
sive custody of the airlines; therefore, Dazo was in the "course of
embarking," so as to apply the Warsaw Convention.3 0 However,
the appellate court found that the services rendered by Globe
were basic airport services; therefore, Dazo was not in the
"course of embarking and Globe was not a 'carrier' within the
meaning of the Convention."3 '
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge O'Scannlain dis-
sented with the majority's opinion and found that Globe was
entitled to the protection of the Warsaw Convention. 32 The dis-
sent argued that because the Warsaw Convention extends to air-
lines' agents and employees, then, to the extent that Globe acts
24 Id.
25 Id. at 939-40.
26 Id. at 940-41.
27 Id. at 939.
28 Airline Appellees' Response to Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for
Hearing En Banc at 2-5, Dazo v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 295 F.3d 934 (9th Cir.
2002) (No. CV 99-20548-JW); Appellee, Globe Airport Security Services' Re-
sponse to Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 4-5, Dazo
v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 295 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV 99-20548-JW).
2 Dazo, 295 F.3d at 938.
so Airline Appellees' Brief at 5-8, Dazo (No. CV 99-20548-JW); Globe Airport
Security Services' Brief at 7-9, Dazo (No. CV 99-20548-JW).
31 See Dazo, 295 F.3d at 938-39.
32 Id. at 941.
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as an agent, it must be afforded the protection of the Conven-
tion.3 3 Furthermore, Globe's service to the three airlines did
not affect their protection under the Convention, because an
agent may serve more than one principal. 34  Accordingly,
Globe's association with America West and Continental did not
destroy its agency relationship with TWA 5.3  Additionally, the
dissent noted that the experience of September 11, 2001 may
have affected the majority's reasoning, and charged the court to
apply the law faithfully and evenhandedly.3 6
The Dazo court incorrectly refused to apply the liability limita-
tions of the Warsaw Convention to Globe. In coming to the con-
clusion that the Warsaw Convention was not applicable in this
situation, the court correctly concluded that Dazo's flight was an
international flight. The court analyzed that the flight's stop in
St. Louis before Toronto did not change the flight's status as
international under the Convention. 7 This analysis is correct
because flight layovers do not affect the final destination of the
flight, and a stop should not affect the consideration of the
flight as international. However, the court failed to mention
whether Dazo was a "passenger" of international transportation
within the meaning of the Convention. Dazo asserts that she is
not a "passenger" because she is passing through an inspection
point and is "far removed from the operation of an aircraft. '3
While the court should not have accepted Dazo's argument be-
cause Dazo possessed a ticket for an international flight, the
court should have addressed this argument.
The court also erred in determining that the services ren-
dered by Globe did not advance Dazo's contract for an interna-
tional flight on TWA. The court asserts that because Globe
performed a security check that was required under federal law,
Globe only performed basic airport services, not services re-
quired by the Warsaw Convention. 9 The court fails to distin-
guish these facts from the case of Baker v. Lansdell Protective
Agency, Inc.,4" which had very similar facts; however, that court
33 Id. at 942.
34 Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1958).
35 Dazo, 295 F.3d at 942.
36 Id. at 943.
37 Id. at 938.
38 Appellant's Petition for Re-Hearing and Suggestion for Hearing En Banc at
5-6, Dazo v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 295 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-
15058).
39 Dazo, 295 F.3d at 938-39.
40 Baker v. Lansdell Protective Agency, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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decided that the security screening is part of the embarkation
process of an international flight. In the Baker case, an airline
passenger's jewelry was stolen from her carry-on bag while she
passed through a federally mandated security checkpoint. 4'
Like Globe, the security checkpoint was run by an independent
security agency. 42 The district court decided that: (1) the secur-
ity company "is entitled to invoke the liability limitation of the
Convention," and (2) "it is appropriate to characterize [the pas-
senger] as being in the course of one of the operations of em-
barking" where the passenger was engaged in pre-flight security
screening.4 3 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly decided
that because federal law requires the security checkpoint, the
services did not promote the operation of embarkation on an
international flight, which the Warsaw Convention governs.
Additionally, the court reasoned that because passengers and
non-passengers went through the security checkpoint, the Con-
vention would not apply.44 This reasoning is skewed because as
Dazo passed through the security point, she was in the course of
embarking, and the Warsaw Convention would apply to an inter-
national passenger embarking on an international flight. The
airlines assert that because ticketed international passengers
must pass through the security checkpoint to board the aircraft,
the passengers are embarking.4 5 This proposition is correct be-
cause the passengers would not have any way of getting onto the
aircraft without passing through this point. Accordingly, it is of
no consequence that non-ticketed passengers were also allowed
through the checkpoint.
The crux of the court's error occurred in the analysis of the
agency status of Globe and how it affected their status under the
Warsaw Convention. The court incorrectly found that "no case
supports the proposition that a security company that is acting
as the common agent of multiple airlines, domestic and interna-
tional," should be accorded "carrier" status under the Conven-
tion.46 However, in Julius YoungJewehy Manufacturing Co. v. Delta
Air Lines, the court extended the liability limitations of the War-
saw Convention to an independent contractor that performed
41 Id. at 167.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 170.
44 Dazo, 295 F.3d at 939.
45 Response of Appellee, Globe Airport Security Services to Appellant's Open-
ing Brief at 6 n.3, Dazo v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 268 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2001).
4c, Dazo, 295 F.3d at 939.
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inter-line baggage transfer for Delta.47 In the present case, both
parties agreed that Globe operated as the common agent of the
three airlines, and acted on behalf of the three airlines at the
time of the theft.48 The court reasoned that when an agent
serves two masters, both masters must be liable because of the
agent's negligence; however, the principles of agency law do put
such a restriction on the masters.49 This reasoning is based on a
misunderstanding of agency principles and overextending the
discretionary language of the Restatement. Agency principles
have established that an agent may serve more than one master
"if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the ser-
vice to the other.''51 It does not follow that all three airlines that
Globe served would be liable because the bag was stolen while
Globe served the Airlines. If Dazo could link Globe's actions,
while handling her bag, to each of the airlines, then liability may
follow for each of the airlines. However, in Dazo's case, it is of
no concern that Globe serviced two other airlines in addition to
TWA, which is the airline Dazo intended to board. Globe's ser-
vice to TWA does not involve abandonment to the other air-
lines; therefore, Globe may be a "carrier" under the Warsaw
Convention even though it serves more than one airline.
The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has
declined to follow the consistency of several other circuit courts,
and has decided not to apply the Warsaw Convention to airlines'
agents. This decision by the court has brought confusion to a
consistently applied law. Although the court's reasoning is
flawed in several respects, as discussed above, this opinion may
increase the number of cases that are brought against airlines'
agents with the possibility of winning exorbitant damages. This
opinion does little to improve judicial efficiency, and has al-
lowed the public's inflamed passion to interfere with the correct
application of the law.
47 Julius YoungJewehy Mfg. Co. v. Delta Air Lines, 414 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979).
48 Dazo, 295 F.3d at 938.
49 Id. at 93940; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1958). Both masters
may be liable for an agent's actions, but both masters do not have to be liable.
50 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1958).
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